Are there timing effects in coordination game experiments?

Tao Li ()
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Tao Li: Shanghai University of Finance and Economics

Economics Bulletin, 2007, vol. 3, issue 13, 1-9

Abstract: The timing effects (timing without observability) identified by Weber, Camerer, and Knez (2004) in coordination game experiments are caused by their fixed-matching protocol. When we use a random-matching protocol the alleged timing effects completely vanish.

JEL-codes: C9 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-04-10
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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