On the possibility of licensing in a market with logit demand functions
Giorgos Stamatopoulos ()
Economics Bulletin, 2008, vol. 4, issue 17, 1-11
We analyze the incentives for technology transfer between two firms in a market characterized by a logit demand framework. The available licensing policies of the incumbent innovator are the up front fee, royalty and two-part tariff policies. We show that when the market is covered there is no equilibrium where technology transfer occurs.
JEL-codes: D4 L2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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