A new characterization of absolute qualified majority voting

Nicolas Houy

Economics Bulletin, 2007, vol. 4, issue 4, 1-8

Abstract: We show that the class of absolute qualified majority voting rules are the only ones to satisfy Anonymity, Neutrality, Monotonicity, Weak Pareto and Decisiveness Non-Equivalence. When there are two alternatives x and y, the latter axiom states that if an individual voting for y can improve the result of x by abstaining, then it is not the case that an individual abstaining can improve the result of x by voting for x.

Keywords: Absolute; Qualified; Majority; Voting. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-02-15
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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