Continuing Conflict and Stalemate: A note

Raul Caruso ()

Economics Bulletin, 2007, vol. 4, issue 17, 1-8

Abstract: This note is about the possibility of a stalemate in a continuing conflict. Following the prevailing economic literature on the topic, under some assumptions, the outcome of a conflict can be described in two ways: (i) a predetermined split of the contested output (ii) a winner-take-all contest where the winning agent is capable to grab all the contested stake. By contrast, in reality many disputes do not have a clear or a definite outcome. A stalemate can end the conflict with the result of a draw. To allow for a stalemate some formal modifications to the classical Hirshleifer's model of conflict are needed. In particular, since the cornerstone of the economic literature on conflict is the Contest Success Function the possibility of a stalemate can be captured through a modified form of the CSF as axiomatized by Blavatskyy (2004). When a stalemate can emerge, results show that the scenario exhibits a higher degree of violence.

Keywords: Conflict (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 H5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-05-16
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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