Efficiency and converse reduction-consistency in collective choice

Arthur Robson () and Tiemen Woutersen
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Arthur Robson: Simon Fraser University

Economics Bulletin, 2007, vol. 4, issue 28, 1-7

Abstract: We consider the problem of selecting a subset of a feasible set over which each agent has a strict preference. We propose an invariance property, converse reduction-consistency, which is the converse of reduction-consistency introduced by Yeh (2006), and study its implications. Our results are two characterizations of the Pareto rule: (1) it is the only rule satisfying efficiency and converse reduction-consistency and (2) it is the only rule satisfying one-agent efficiency, converse reduction-consistency, and reduction-consistency.

Keywords: consistency; converse; consistency; efficiency; Pareto; rule; social; choice; correspondences. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-08-10
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