Antipodality in committee selection

Christian Klamler and Daniel Eckert ()

Economics Bulletin, 2008, vol. 4, issue 1, 1-5

Abstract: In this paper we compare a minisum and a minimax procedure as suggested by Brams et al. for selecting committees from a set of candidates. Using a general geometric framework as developed by Don Saari for preference aggregation, we show that antipodality of a unique maximin and a unique minisum winner can occur for any number of candidates larger than two.

JEL-codes: D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-01-12
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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