A selection mechanism for the barter equilibrium in the search theoretic monetary model
Economics Bulletin, 2008, vol. 5, issue 2, 1-10
We modify the standard Kiyotaki-Wright model (1993) in order to add an autarkic option in the agents' choice set. The value of the autarkic option is independent of strategic coordination problems and represents a sort of reservation utility with respect to exchange activity. This allows us to identify the conditions under which we can rule out the barter equilibrium as an exchange coordination outcome. These conditions concern the value of the inter-temporal rate of preference, the total amount of money and the rate of return of the matching technology.
Keywords: Autarky (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-07e00008
Access Statistics for this article
More articles in Economics Bulletin from AccessEcon
Bibliographic data for series maintained by John P. Conley ().