Disclosure of mergers without regulatory restrictions: Insider trading in pre-1914 Germany

Gerhard Kling

Economics Bulletin, 2008, vol. 7, issue 2, 1-7

Abstract: In the pre-World-War I period, lacking regulatory restrictions allowed ‘hidden' mergers however, some companies disclosed information voluntarily. I analyze insider gains by investigating the share price behavior prior to merger announcements. When companies hid information, stocks exhibited positive abnormal returns prior to newspaper reports that uncovered hidden transactions.

JEL-codes: G1 N2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-01-05
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