A trace of anger is enough: on the enforcement of social norms

Jakub Steiner

Economics Bulletin, 2007, vol. 8, issue 1, 1-4

Abstract: It is well documented that the possibility of punishing free-riders increases contributions in one-shot public good games. I demonstrate theoretically that minimal punishment commitments (perhaps provided by anger) may lead to high contribution levels. Thus, almost selfish players may behave as strong reciprocators.

JEL-codes: C7 H4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-01-19
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Working Paper: A Trace of Anger is Enough: On the Enforcement of Social Norms (2005)
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