Timing is Everything - The Labour Market Effects of Union Wage Bargaining

Joerg Lingens ()
Additional contact information
Joerg Lingens: University of Regensburg

Economics Bulletin, 2007, vol. 10, issue 5, 1-11

Abstract: This paper analyses the labour market effects of union wage bargaining for different sequences of the employment choice and the wage bargain. The result that collective bargaining decreases (firm-level) employment in a right-to-manage setting hinges on the assumption that employment is chosen by the firm after the wage bargain ("ex-ante" bargaining). Turning this sequence upside down ("ex-post" bargaining), the firm uses employment choice as a strategic variable for the wage bargain. Employment will be equal to the competitive case and wages will be higher. Although we strictly assume right-to-manage, the timing of the bargain ensures an efficient contract.

Keywords: right-to-manage (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-04-30
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/EB/2007/Volume10/EB-07J50001A.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-07j50001

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Economics Bulletin from AccessEcon
Bibliographic data for series maintained by John P. Conley ().