Horizontal mergers for buyer power

Ramon Fauli-Oller () and Lluis Bru
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Ramon Fauli-Oller: Universitat d'Alacant

Economics Bulletin, 2008, vol. 12, issue 3, 1-7

Abstract: Salant et al. (1983) showed in a Cournot setting that horizontal mergers are unprofitable because outsiders react by increasing their output. We show that this negative effect may be compensated by the positive effect that horizontal mergers have on the buyer power of merging firms in input markets.

JEL-codes: L0 L1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-01-18
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Related works:
Working Paper: HORIZONTAL MERGERS FOR BUYER POWER (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-07l00002

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