Mixed Motives of Simultaneous-move Games in a Mixed Duopoly: Comments and Erratum

Kangsik Choi

Economics Bulletin, 2007, vol. 12, issue 32, 1-4

Abstract: If the public and private firm have mixed motives about payoff in a simultaneous-move game, Choi (2006) analyzes that the resulting equilibrium turns out to be an inefficient level with the monopoly of private firm even if there are Nash equilibria. However, we find that if we use equilibrium profit, we would have solved its unique Nash equilibrium that both firms aim to maximize the relative payoffs.

Keywords: Mixed; Duopoly (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L0 L2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-11-30
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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