Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly: The Managerial Delegation Case

Yasuhiko Nakamura and Tomohiro Inoue ()
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Tomohiro Inoue: Graduate School of Economics, Waseda University

Economics Bulletin, 2007, vol. 12, issue 27, 1-7

Abstract: We introduce managerial delegation into Pal's (1998) model and examine the impact of the introduction of managerial delegation on endogenous timing in a mixed duopolistic model for differentiated goods. We show that a public firm and a private firm choose quantities sequentially in the equilibrium of our model. Thus, we find that the Pal''s (1998) results are robust against managerial delegation.

Keywords: Endogenous; Timing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L2 L3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-10-19
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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