Extended producer responsibility in oligopoly

Hiroaki Ino

Economics Bulletin, 2007, vol. 17, issue 6, 1-9

Abstract: I investigate the optimal environmental tax under a policy based on extended producer responsibility (EPR) in oligopoly markets. I introduce the recycling market and explicitly consider how these policies affect the incentive for recycling. I derive the optimal tax rule, which depends on the weighted sum of the markup in the product market and the markdown in the recycling market. In contrast to the existing works that emphasize that the optimal tax rate is lower than the marginal external damage, I find that the optimal tax rate can be higher than the marginal external damage.

JEL-codes: L1 Q2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-07-06
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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