Hotelling's Location Model with Quality Choice in Mixed Duopoly

Yasuo Sanjo ()
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Yasuo Sanjo: Graduate School of Economics, Nagoya University

Economics Bulletin, 2007, vol. 18, issue 2, 1-11

Abstract: We investigate a mixed duopoly market by introducing quality choice into the Hotelling-type spatial competition model with linear transportation costs. We show that there does not exist a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) of location choice in the three-stage game that is location-then-quality choice and subsequent price choice. Moreover, we show the conditions of the existence of the quality equilibrium.

JEL-codes: L1 R3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-03-27
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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