Equilibrium Existence in Bipartite Social Games: A Generalization of Stable Matchings

Matthew Jackson and Alison Watts ()
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Alison Watts: Southern Illinois University

Economics Bulletin, 2008, vol. 3, issue 12, 1-8

Abstract: We prove existence of equilibria in bipartite social games, where players choose both a strategy in a game and a partner with whom to play the game. Such social games generalize the well-known marriage problem where players choose partners but do not take actions subsequent to matching.

Keywords: Social; Games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A1 C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-03-02
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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