Value allocations in economies with coalition structure

Francesca Centrone and Claudia Meo ()
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Claudia Meo: Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Metodi Quantitativi, Università del Piemonte Orientale

Economics Bulletin, 2008, vol. 3, issue 49, 1-8

Abstract: We embody a notion of stability for coalition structures by Hart and Kurz (1983) into the framework of general equilibrium, by generalizing the classical value allocation notion (Shapley, 1969) to situations where: (a) agents organize themselves voluntarily into coalition structures (b) the process of coalition formation is treated as endogenous. To this end we introduce the definition of stable coalition structure value allocation and provide, under standard hypotheses, a preliminary existence result for the three player case in an exchange economy.

JEL-codes: C7 D5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-08-25
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