Linear, efficient and symmetric values for TU-games

Célestin Nembua () and Nicolas Gabriel Andjiga ()
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Nicolas Gabriel Andjiga: Ecole normale Supérieure (Cameroon)

Economics Bulletin, 2008, vol. 3, issue 71, 1-10

Abstract: In this paper, we study values for TU-games which satisfy three classical properties: Linearity, efficiency and symmetry. We give the general analytical form of these values and their relation with the Shapley value and the Egalitarian value.

JEL-codes: C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-11-02
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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