Further investigations of framing effects on cooperative choices in a provision point mechanism

Koji Kotani, Shunsuke Managi and Kenta Tanaka

Economics Bulletin, 2008, vol. 3, issue 51, 1-9

Abstract: We investigate whether framing effects of voluntary contributions are significant in a provision point mechanism. Our results show that framing significantly affects individuals of the same type: cooperative individuals appear to be more cooperative in the public bads game than in the public goods game, whereas individualistic subjects appear to be less cooperative in the public bads game than in the public goods game. At the aggregate level of pooling all individuals, the data suggests that framing effects are negligible, which is in contrast with the established result.

JEL-codes: C9 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-08-31
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/EB/2008/Volume3/EB-08C90006A.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-08c90006

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Economics Bulletin from AccessEcon
Bibliographic data for series maintained by John P. Conley ().