Price Discrimination As Portfolio Diversification

Parikshit Ghosh

Economics Bulletin, 2008, vol. 4, issue 5, 1-9

Abstract: A seller seeking to sell an indivisible object can post (possibly different) prices to each of n buyers. Buyers' valuations are private information and drawn independently from the same distribution. If the seller can choose who to sell to in the event there are several willing buyers, her optimal strategy is to post different prices to different buyers. For some distributions, price discrimination may be profitable even if excess demand must be resolved through a uniform lottery.

JEL-codes: D4 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-03-07
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/EB/2008/Volume4/EB-08D40018A.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-08d40018

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Economics Bulletin from AccessEcon
Bibliographic data for series maintained by John P. Conley ().