Firms' symmetry and sustainability of collusion in a Hotelling duopoly

Stefano Colombo ()

Economics Bulletin, 2009, vol. 29, issue 1, 338-346

Abstract: We use a differentiated duopoly a la Hotelling to assess the impact of firms' symmetry on the sustainability of a tacit collusive agreement. We obtain that the smaller firm has the greater incentive to deviate and that symmetry helps collusion for any possible differentiation degree.

JEL-codes: D4 L1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-03-13
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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