Consistent conjectural variations equilibria in strategic multilateral exchange

Ludovic Julien ()

Economics Bulletin, 2009, vol. 29, issue 1, 465-473

Abstract: In this note, we address the problem of determining which conjectural variations general equilibria are consistent in strategic multilateral exchange. We therefore consider expectations in a simple conjectural general equilibrium model of a pure exchange economy under strategic interactions. Three results are obtained. Firstly, the competitive equilibrium is a locally consistent conjectural general equilibrium. Secondly, the symmetric Cournot oligopoly equilibrium is not a locally consistent conjectural general equilibrium. Thirdly, the symmetric collusive equilibrium is a locally consistent conjectural general equilibrium.

JEL-codes: D4 D5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-03-27
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