Dynamic political economy of redistribution policy: the role of education costs

Tetsuo Ono and Ryo Arawatari

Economics Bulletin, 2008, vol. 4, issue 13, 1-13

Abstract: This paper focuses on how education costs affect the political determination of redistribution policy via individual decision making on education. For cases of high costs, there are multiple equilibria: the poor-majority equilibrium featured by the minority of highly educated individuals and a high level of redistribution, and the rich-majority equilibrium featured by the majority of highly educated individuals and a low level of redistribution. For cases of low costs, there is a unique rich-majority equilibrium featured by the majority of highly educated individuals and a high level of redistribution.

JEL-codes: D7 H5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-05-29
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Dynamic Political Economy of Redistribution Policy: The Role of Education Costs (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-08d70025

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