Rationalizability of one-to-one matchings with externalities

Ismail Saglam and Ayşe Mumcu

Economics Bulletin, 2008, vol. 4, issue 33, 1-8

Abstract: In this paper, we show that the one-to-one matching model of Mumcu and Saglam (2008) studying stability under interdependent preferences is refutable. We also give a sufficient characterization of the set of matchings that are rationalizable inside the core.

Keywords: One-to-one; matching; Stability; Externalities; Rationalizability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-11-18
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Rationalizability of One-to-One Matchings with Externalities (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-08d70031

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