Strategic Trade Policy in Bargaining over Managerial Delegation Competition

Leonard Wang (), Wei Zhao () and Ya -Chin Wang ()
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Wei Zhao: Jinhe Center for Economic Research, Xi¡¦an Jiaotong University
Ya -Chin Wang: Department of Finance and Banking, Kun Shan University

Economics Bulletin, 2008, vol. 6, issue 38, 1-8

Abstract: In this paper, we assess the influence of the generalized Nash bargaining model on strategic trade policies. In particular, how the trade policy and the bargaining process over managerial contract are strategically connected within the context of bargaining over the sales delegation model is analyzed. We explore the policy impacts in two different models: the export rivalry model and the import-competing model, and show that the introduction of managers' bargaining process leads to a decrease in the export subsidy and optimal tariff in different models.

Keywords: Bargaining; Delegation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 F1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-09-16
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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