Potential conflicts in the fight against counterfeit drugs

Paolo Rungo, Berta Rivera and Luis Currais ()

Economics Bulletin, 2008, vol. 9, issue 5, 1-7

Abstract: This analysis looks at the best way to deal with the proliferation of fake drugs, and considers the conflict that arises when government agencies aim to reduce the harmful effects of the fake medicine trade while the pharmaceutical firms seek profit maximization. It is demonstrated that the pharmaceutical industry might wish to encourage better law enforcement rather than improved information policies, even when the latter would lead to a greater reduction in the fake drug trade.

Keywords: fake; medicine; trade (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H0 I1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-03-27
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