The Distributive Role of Managerial Incentives in a Mixed Duopoly

Rudra Sensarma and Bibhas Saha

Economics Bulletin, 2008, vol. 12, issue 28, 1-10

Abstract: We study a mixed oligopoly where a partially public firm competeswith a private firm. When the private firm offers managerialincentives, there is a redistribution of profit and output fromthe private to the public firm, but the aggregate output andsocial welfare may remain unchanged. When the private firm isforeign owned, the extent of privatization is less whilemanagerial incentives are milder.

Keywords: mixed; duopoly (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L1 L3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-10-31
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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