A note on quantity precommitment, cournot outcome and asymmetric capacity costs

Nicolas Gruyer
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Nicolas Gruyer: LEEA-ENAC Toulouse

Economics Bulletin, 2009, vol. 29, issue 1, 384-391

Abstract: This paper extends Kreps and Scheinkman's 1983 result, which shows that a production capacity choice stage followed by price competition yields the same outcome as a Cournot game, to a setting where capacity costs are asymmetric.

Keywords: Asymmetric; costs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D4 L1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-03-23
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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