Managerial Delegation in a Mixed Duopoly with a Foreign Competitor
Economics Bulletin, 2009, vol. 29, issue 1, 90-99
We examine firms' decisions to hire managers in a duopoly where a public firm competes with a foreign private firm. In contrast with the case in which the public firm competes with a domestic private firm -where only the private firm decides to hire a manager- we find that both firms hire managers. This leads to a social welfare higher than the one obtained when neither firm hires a manager.
Keywords: Mixed; oligopoly (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L1 L3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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