Managerial Delegation in a Mixed Duopoly with a Foreign Competitor

Jorge Fernández-Ruiz

Economics Bulletin, 2009, vol. 29, issue 1, 90-99

Abstract: We examine firms' decisions to hire managers in a duopoly where a public firm competes with a foreign private firm. In contrast with the case in which the public firm competes with a domestic private firm -where only the private firm decides to hire a manager- we find that both firms hire managers. This leads to a social welfare higher than the one obtained when neither firm hires a manager.

Keywords: Mixed; oligopoly (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L1 L3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-02-13
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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