Sustainability of collusion with imperfect price discrimination and inelastic demand functions
Stefano Colombo ()
Economics Bulletin, 2009, vol. 29, issue 3, 1687-1694
We study the impact of product differentiation on collusion sustainability in the case of imperfect price discrimination and inelastic demand functions. We show that differentiation facilitates the sustainability of collusion. Therefore, the indifference result of Gupta and Venkatu (2002) does not hold when imperfect price discrimination is introduced.
Keywords: Imperfect; price; discrimination; Tacit; collusion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L1 D4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-09-00132
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