Coordinating choice in partial cooperative equilibrium

Lina Mallozzi () and Stef Tijs ()
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Lina Mallozzi: University of Naples Federico II
Stef Tijs: University of Tilburg

Economics Bulletin, 2009, vol. 29, issue 2, 1459-1465

Abstract: In this paper we consider symmetric aggregative games and investigate partial cooperation between a portion of the players that sign a cooperative agreement and the rest of the players. Existence results of partial cooperative equilibria are obtained when the players who do not sign the agreement play a Nash equilibrium game having multiple solutions. Some applications in the supermodular case are discussed.

Keywords: Noncooperative games; cooperation; aggregative games; supermodular games. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-06-28
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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