A general strategy-proof fair allocation mechanism revisited

Tommy Andersson

Economics Bulletin, 2009, vol. 29, issue 3, 1717-1722

Abstract: This paper revisits the fair and optimal allocation mechanism (Sun and Yang, Economics Letters 81:73-79, 2003) and demonstrates that it is coalitionally strategy-proof. The proof is valid for general preferences, it is simple and it is short.

Keywords: assignment game; fairness; strategy-proofness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-07-20
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