Parliamentary voting rules and strategic candidacy

Boniface Mbih, Issofa Moyouwou () and Abdoul Ndiaye
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Issofa Moyouwou: ENS Yaoundé

Economics Bulletin, 2009, vol. 29, issue 2, 1371-1379

Abstract: In this paper we study the vulnerability of parliamentary voting procedures to strategic candidacy. Candidates involved in an election are susceptible to influence the outcome by opting out or opting in. In the context of three-alternative elections and under the impartial anonymous culture assumption, we evaluate the frequencies of such strategic candidacy opportunities.

Keywords: strategic candidacy; parliamentary voting procedures; opting out; opting in; impartial anonymous culture. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-06-08
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Working Paper: Parliamentary voting rules and strategic candidacy (2009)
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