On mixed and behavioural strategies

Charalambos Aliprantis (), Dionysius Glycopantis () and Allan Muir ()
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Charalambos Aliprantis: Department of Economics, Purdue University
Dionysius Glycopantis: Department of Economics, City University
Allan Muir: Department of Mathematics, City University

Economics Bulletin, 2009, vol. 29, issue 3, 1783-1795

Abstract: In the context of extensive form games, we are considering the relation between mixed and behavioural strategies. We look again at the famous Kuhn theorem and also discuss a result for games in which no path intersects any information set in more than one node. We apply the principle mathematical of induction on the number of information sets treated behaviourally.

Keywords: Extensive form games; Pure strategies; Information sets; Mixed strategies; Behavioural strategies; A path; G-type games; (No)-Absentmindedness; Perfect recall; Equivalence; Probability distributions; Marginal probabilities; Induction. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-07-26
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