Behavioral biases in auctions: an experimental study

Anna Dodonova and Yuri Khoroshilov

Economics Bulletin, 2009, vol. 29, issue 3, 2218-2226

Abstract: This paper investigates implications of some of the well-known behavioral biases of bidders' behavior in different types of auctions. It presents the results of an experimental study that tests the endowment hypothesis for English auctions and regret aversion hypothesis for first-price sealed-bid auctions. This study documents support for the former and no support for the latter hypotheses.

Keywords: auction; regret; endowment effect; loss aversion; behavioral economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-09-04
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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