Free riders and strong reciprocators coexist in public goods experiments: evolutionary foundations
Paolo Russu () and
Economics Bulletin, 2010, vol. 30, issue 1, 720-733
Experimental evidence indicates that free riders and strongly reciprocal papers coexist in the public goods game framework. By means of an evolutionary analysis, we provide an endogenization of this behavioral regularity.
Keywords: Free Riding; Cooperation; Strong Reciprocity; Public Goods Game; Evolutionary Game Theory. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 Z1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Working Paper: Free riders and strong reciprocators coexist in public goods experiments: evolutionary foundations (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-09-00509
Access Statistics for this article
More articles in Economics Bulletin from AccessEcon
Bibliographic data for series maintained by John P. Conley ().