Free riders and strong reciprocators coexist in public goods experiments: evolutionary foundations

Angelo Antoci, Paolo Russu () and Luca Zarri

Economics Bulletin, 2010, vol. 30, issue 1, 720-733

Abstract: Experimental evidence indicates that free riders and strongly reciprocal papers coexist in the public goods game framework. By means of an evolutionary analysis, we provide an endogenization of this behavioral regularity.

Keywords: Free Riding; Cooperation; Strong Reciprocity; Public Goods Game; Evolutionary Game Theory. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 Z1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-03-11
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-09-00509

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