Spatial competition among multiple platforms

Toshiki Kodera ()
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Toshiki Kodera: Graduate School of Economics, Nagoya University

Economics Bulletin, 2010, vol. 30, issue 2, 1516-1525

Abstract: We study spatial competition in two-sided markets, in which platforms engage in price competition in a circular city. After analyzing the pricing and profits of the unique symmetric equilibrium for a given number of platforms, we derive the number of platforms under free entry and compare it with the social optimum. We consider the case with or without a price restriction. In contrast to the excess entry result in Salop's (1979) model, the number of platforms is smaller than the social optimum if a minimum price binds, and if cross-group network effects are sufficiently large for a group of agents.

JEL-codes: L1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-05-25
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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