Product Innovation and Stability of Collusion

Sougata Poddar () and Bibhas Saha

Economics Bulletin, 2010, vol. 30, issue 2, 1392-1400

Abstract: We study the nature of market competition in relation to stability of collusion in the infinitely repeated play of a two-stage game of product innovation and market competition, and show that cooperation in giving R&D efforts is more easily sustained when firms compete in quantity than in price.

Keywords: R&D Effort; Product differentiation; Collusion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D4 L1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-05-16
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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