Incomplete third-degree price discrimination, and market partition problem

Yann Braouezec

Economics Bulletin, 2009, vol. 29, issue 4, 2908-2917

Abstract: We introduce in this paper the "incomplete" third-degree price discrimination, which is the situation where a monopolist must charge at most k different prices while the total market is composed of n markets, with n>k. We thus study the optimal partition problem of the n markets in k groups. As a byproduct, when k=2, we are able to reconsider the so-called (Robinsonian) weak-strong partition.

Keywords: Price discrimination; monopoly; decentralized decision process; optimal partition problem; profit maximization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L0 L1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-11-20
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Related works:
Working Paper: Incomplete Third-Degree Price Discrimination and Market Partition Problem (2009)
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