Efficient Nash equilibria, individual rights and Pareto principle: an impossibility result

Enrico Guzzini ()
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Enrico Guzzini: Università Politecnica delle Marche, Italy

Economics Bulletin, 2010, vol. 30, issue 1, 103-114

Abstract: This paper shows an impossibility result similar to the liberal paradox concerning two games, each of one with an efficient Nash equilibrium. We show that our result holds also in dictatorial games.

Keywords: Liberal paradox; efficient Nash equilibrium; Pareto principle; dictatorial games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-01-11
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