Privatization and the Environment in a Mixed Duopoly with Pollution Abatement

Leonard Wang (), Ya-chin Wang () and Lihong Zhao ()
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Ya-chin Wang: Department of Finance and Banking, Kun Shan University
Lihong Zhao: China Huanqiu Contracting & Engineering Corporation

Economics Bulletin, 2009, vol. 29, issue 4, 3112-3119

Abstract: The purpose of this note is to re-examine whether privatization improves the environment or not in a mixed duopolistic model. In our model, both firms adopt pollution abatement technologies in response to the environmental tax imposed by the government. It is shown that privatization unambiguously reduces the pollution levels of firms. Namely, privatization does improve the environment. Moreover, by implementing partial-privatization policy, social welfare can be enhanced.

Keywords: Environmental Taxes; Mixed Oligopoly: Privatization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L1 Q5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-12-16
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (26)

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