On higher hurdles for incumbents

Hans Gersbach

Economics Bulletin, 2010, vol. 30, issue 1, 774-785

Abstract: The election mechanism has difficulties in selecting the most able candidates and deselecting less able ones. In a simple model we explore how the power of elections as a selection device can be improved by requiring higher vote thresholds than 50% for incumbents.

Keywords: Third; JEL; Category:; H4; Elections; political contracts; vote-share thresholds; incumbents; selection; effort. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-03-24
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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