Preferences, market power and oligopolistic competition: an example
Ludovic Julien and
Fabrice Tricou ()
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Fabrice Tricou: Economix, Université Paris Ouest-Nanterre la Défense
Economics Bulletin, 2009, vol. 29, issue 4, 2918-2923
This paper studies the way market power operates under symmetric oligopoly equilibrium. Stressing the role of preferences and focusing on price manipulation, four results are obtained about asymptotic identifications (for degenerate preferences and large economies) and about welfare configurations.
Keywords: Pure exchange; strategic interactions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D4 D5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-09-00667
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