Preferences, market power and oligopolistic competition: an example

Ludovic Julien () and Fabrice Tricou ()
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Fabrice Tricou: Economix, Université Paris Ouest-Nanterre la Défense

Economics Bulletin, 2009, vol. 29, issue 4, 2918-2923

Abstract: This paper studies the way market power operates under symmetric oligopoly equilibrium. Stressing the role of preferences and focusing on price manipulation, four results are obtained about asymptotic identifications (for degenerate preferences and large economies) and about welfare configurations.

Keywords: Pure exchange; strategic interactions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D4 D5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-11-23
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-09-00667

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