A note on competitive prices in multilateral assignment markets

Oriol Tejada

Economics Bulletin, 2010, vol. 30, issue 1, 658-662

Abstract: A multilateral assignment market with buyers and a number of different types of firms can be modeled by a multi-sided assignment game. We prove that core allocations of the latter are in a one-to-one correspondence with competitive prices of the former, where the notion of competitive price extends that of Roth and Sotomayor (1990). This result generalizes to multi-sided assignment markets the characterization of competitive prices known for the two-sided case.

Keywords: Assignment games; multi-sided markets; competitive prices; core (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-03-05
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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