A Comment on "The consequences of the minimum wage when other wages are bargained over"

Jürgen Wiemers ()
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Jürgen Wiemers: Institute for Employment Research (IAB)

Economics Bulletin, 2010, vol. 30, issue 1, 374-382

Abstract: Cahuc, Saint-Martin, and Zylberberg (2001) show numerically that a minimum wage hike can increase both skilled and unskilled employment in a right-to-manage wage bargaining setting. This comment demonstrates that this result crucially depends on an implicitly unrealistic choice for the skilled workers' alternative wage.

Keywords: Minimum wage; Wage bargaining; Employment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J2 J3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-01-28
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