Revisiting Nash wages negotiations in matching models

Samir Amine, Pedro Lages dos santos (), Sylvain Baumann () and Fabrice Valognes
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Pedro Lages dos santos: University of Le Havre
Sylvain Baumann: University of Le Havre

Economics Bulletin, 2009, vol. 29, issue 4, 3203-3213

Abstract: In labour economics theory, wage negotiations use to rely on a Symmetric Nash Bargaining Solution. The aim of this study is to show that this kind of solution may be not relevant. Indeed, in a matching model framework, the comparison with the Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution suggests that a reflection should systematically be made with respect to the negotiation power of each agent (a same ascertainment has been pointed out by McDonald and Solow (1981)). Finally, we characterize the Kalai-Smorodinsky in the job matching setting.

Keywords: Matching; bargaining solutions; public policy. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 J6 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-12-23
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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