The effect of post-election asymmetry information possibility on pre-election policy platform choices

David Yi ()
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David Yi: Xavier University

Economics Bulletin, 2009, vol. 29, issue 4, 3233-3243

Abstract: In this paper, we examine the effect of a possibility of post-election information asymmetry between voters and candidates on pre-election policy platform choices by candidates. We show that this possibility may lead candidates to over commit during election campaign, which may contribute to an ex post moral hazard problem.

Keywords: Electoral competition; Ex-post information asymmetry; Moral hazard; Policy platform choice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-12-29
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-09-00750

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