Allocations and Price Trends in Sequential Auctions under Complete Information with Symmetric Bidders

Mohamed Jeddy (), Bruno Larue () and Jean-Philippe Gervais ()
Additional contact information
Mohamed Jeddy: CREA, Laval University
Bruno Larue: CREA, Laval University

Economics Bulletin, 2010, vol. 30, issue 1, 429-436

Abstract: We analyze sequential second-price auctions under complete information involving two or more bidders with similar decreasing marginal valuations. Krishna (1999) designed a 2-bidder numerical example to show the existence of two symmetric equilibria characterized by an asymmetric allocation and weakly declining prices. We generalize Krishna's insights by showing that symmetric (asymmetric) allocations imply constant (weakly declining) price patterns and we derive the necessary conditions supporting symmetric allocations. The conditions become increasingly restrictive as the number of object increases.

Keywords: auctions; complete information; price trends; allocations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-02-02
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2010/Volume30/EB-10-V30-I1-P38.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-09-00794

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Economics Bulletin from AccessEcon
Bibliographic data for series maintained by John P. Conley ().