Money and price dynamics in a market with strategic bargaining

Noritaka Kudoh

Economics Bulletin, 2010, vol. 30, issue 1, 709-719

Abstract: This paper studies a strategic bargaining model of money and prices to complement the results reported in Coles and Wright (1998). The probability of a bargaining breakdown is chosen to be consistent with market conditions in the spirit of Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985). The unique monetary steady state coincides with the one under asymmetric Nash bargaining. The dynamics of the price level are determined without any reference to the value of search. The dynamic properties of the model resemble those of traditional monetary models.

Keywords: money; bargaining; price dynamics. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 E4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-03-10
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