Too close for comfort? Politician - interest group relations under voters' supervision

Etienne Farvaque and Gaël Lagadec ()
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Gaël Lagadec: Université de Nouvelle-Calédonie

Economics Bulletin, 2010, vol. 30, issue 2, 1401-1410

Abstract: This article analyzes the dynamics of electoral promises towards the population and interest groups, focusing on the reaction of voters to the proximity of a candidate to interests groups. In a two-period electoral competition model, we show that a (re)election seeking politician must consider the inherent characteristics of voters whilst making announcements and seeking financial support or implementing policies, not to be penalized by strategic voters.

Keywords: Interest groups; Promises; Elections; Campaign (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 P1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-05-18
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Working Paper: Too close for comfort ? Politician - interest group relations under voters supervision (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-10-00072

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